Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies by George Zodrow
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies
Volume Author/Editor: Harvey S. Rosen, ed.




Chapter Title: Eliminating State and Local Tax Deductibility: A General Equilibrium
Model of Revenue Effects
Chapter Author: George Zodrow
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7887
Chapter pages in book: (p. 177 - 214)6  Eliminating State and Local 
Tax Deductibility: A General 
Equilibrium Model of 
Revenue Effects 
George R. Zodrow 
6.1  Introduction 
Much attention has been focused recently  on the effects of elimi- 
nating or reducing federal deductibility of  state and local taxes. Early 
congressional  reform proposals  recommended the elimination of de- 
ductibility for various  state and local  taxes, and the November 1984 
Treasury proposal, as  well as  the May 1985 administration reform pack- 
age recommended complete elimination. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
eliminates deductibility for general sales taxes, and further curtailment 
is  frequently  suggested  as a  means of  reducing  currently projected 
budget deficits. 
Eliminating deductibility raises a host of troublesome issues, includ- 
ing a wide variety of allocational and distributional questions, which 
have been examined in the literature (see Kenyon 1986 and Advisory 
Commission  on Intergovernmental Relations  1985a). This paper fo- 
cuses primarily on the revenue issues raised in a recent paper by Feld- 
stein and Metcalf (1987), who argue that changes in the revenue mix 
utilized by state and local governments will result in dramatic reduc- 
tions in the federal revenue gained from eliminating deductibility, rel- 
ative to revenue estimates that ignore such adjustments. Specifically, 
they argue that the elimination of deductibility of  state and local per- 
sonal taxes (income,  property, and general sales taxes) will induce state 
and local governments to switch to business taxes which remain fully 
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deductible against federal taxes under all the reform proposals. Since 
only the portion of personal taxes which are claimed by itemizers are 
deducted from the federal tax base while virtually all business taxes 
are deducted and at generally higher tax rates, this change in the state 
and local revenue mix potentially could have dramatic consequences 
for federal revenue. Indeed, Feldstein and Metcalf  estimate that the 
change in the state and local revenue mix induced by eliminating de- 
ductibility would eliminate between one-half and all of the revenue gain 
predicted by “static” revenue estimating techniques which ignore such 
revenue mix effects.’ 
The impact of such a response on the extent to which marginal tax 
rates could  be reduced within  the context of  a  revenue-neutral  tax 
reform  is  obviously  significant.  For example, Feldstein and  Metcalf 
note that, by  1990, elimination of deductibility in the administration 
reform package would account for more than 85 percent of the revenue 
obtained from individual base-broadening items; the much more limited 
repeal of deductibility for only general sales taxes is predicted to raise 
approximately $4 billion by  1990. 
There is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the revenue 
effects of eliminating deductibility. The Feldstein and Metcalf results 
are in marked contrast to earlier studies by Zimmerman (1983), Hettich 
and Winer (1984), Noto and Zimmerman (1983), and Inman (1986), who 
find that the state and local revenue mix is not responsive (or responsive 
in the wrong direction) to changes in the effective cost of using various 
revenue instruments when the benefits of federal tax deductibility are 
taken into account; Feldstein and Metcalf provide a critique of these 
earlier  studies. Other studies suggest that only certain taxes are re- 
sponsive to changes in their effective costs due to changes in deduct- 
ibility. For example, Kenyon (1986) finds that state use of income taxes 
is highly sensitive to changes in deductibility while state use of sales 
taxes is  not, while Gade (1986) finds instead  that state use of  sales 
taxes is more responsive to changes in deductibility than is state use 
of income taxes; Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (in this volume) suggest that 
municipal use of deductible personal taxes is responsive to changes in 
federal  deductibility, but  the use of  sources of finance  that are not 
deductible at the personal level is not, Additional uncertainty is created 
by the fact that the estimated coefficients used by Feldstein and Metcalf 
to generate their revenue predictions  are characterized by  relatively 
large standard errors. Finally, the appropriate model of state and local 
government tax and expenditure determination is far from clear. 
One frequently used candidate is the median voter model (e.g., see 
Gramlich 1985 and Zimmerman  1983); the mediamvoter framework is 
utilized in this paper. However, several alternatives are equally plau- 
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which accounts for the political influence of nonmedian voters on tax 
and expenditure policies, as  well as various migration models (e.g., see 
Herzog and Schlottmann 1986) and “Leviathan” models of government 
behavior  (e.g.,  see Romer and Rosenthal 1983). Since all  these ap- 
proaches have their proponents and detractors, any study based on a 
particular model is more likely to  be viewed as simply providing another 
candidate for explaining the effects of eliminating deductibility rather 
than providing the definitive answer. For all of these reasons, it would 
seem fair to say that there is still some uncertainty regarding the effects 
of eliminating deductibility on the state and local revenue mix and on 
federal tax revenues. 
In this paper,  I  construct a two-sector general equilibrium model 
which,  although  obviously  not  a  substitute for the type of  detailed 
revenue estimation performed by the Treasury, is designed to focus on 
these effects and to provide additional information relevant to the ques- 
tion of the directions and magnitudes of the revenue effects of elimi- 
nating deductibility. Three aspects of this approach differentiate it from 
previous analyses. First, the two-sector approach permits the modeling 
of two very different responses to the elimination of deductibility. In 
general it is clear that, within a framework where the government is 
acting to maximize the welfare of the median voter, the response will 
depend quite dramatically on whether the median voter is an itemizer. 
If this is the case, the median voter will experience a significant change 
in the effective price of government services-to  a price of one from 
a price of one minus the individual marginal tax rate in the simplest 
case-while  if  the median  voter is  not  an itemizer,  eliminating de- 
ductibility will not directly affect the effective tax price for government 
services. The model is constructed to emphasize how the responses of 
jurisdictions where the median  voter is  an itemizer  differ  from the 
responses ofjurisdictions where that is not the case, with the aggregate 
effects depending on the relative sizes of the itemizer and nonitemizer 
sectors. 
Second, a  general  equilibrium approach permits an analysis of a 
number of endogenous responses to the elimination of deductibility, 
including the reallocation of capital which  will occur in response to 
changes in state and local capital taxes and the associated changes in 
the net return to capital, wages, and income. These in turn permit an 
explicit calculation of the effects on both personal and corporate federal 
tax revenues, as well as  a calculation of the reduction in tax rates made 
possible  by  eliminating  deductibility  when  revenue mix  and general 
equilibrium effects are taken into account. In addition, a general equi- 
librium analysis  permits explicit calculation of the effects of the re- 
duction in marginal tax rates on the endogenous variables in the model. 
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depend on views about incidence; the analysis in this paper provides 
an explicit calculation of these effects within the context  of a Harberger- 
type general equilibrium model. 
Third, in light of  the uncertainty described above regarding the rev- 
enue effects of eliminating deductibility, the model may be useful in 
that it provides results that suggest what state and local governments 
“should” do in response to the elimination of deductibility if they are 
in fact following the median voter paradigm. The model makes explicit 
behavioral  assumptions about governmental behavior,  including  the 
choice of revenue instruments, and then calculates the implications of 
those assumptions when deductibility is eliminated. To the extent the 
model and its behavioral assumptions are believable, some insight as 
to the optimal long-run response to eliminating deductibility may be 
obtained. In this sense, the paper is similar in spirit to the earlier work 
of Zodrow and Mieszkowski  (1986), in  which  a general equilibrium 
framework is used to analyze the national effects of both tax and ex- 
penditure policies that are determined endogenously at the local level. 
Before proceeding, it may be useful to comment briefly on the dif- 
ficulties  of  using a Harberger-type model  to analyze the effects  of 
eliminating  deductibility-in  addition  to the problem of determining 
which model of state and local tax and expenditure determination  to 
employ. An obvious problem characteristic of such analytical models 
is that a very high level of aggregation is required; in the model ana- 
lyzed, the economy is simply divided into two groups of states with 
each group assumed to act as a single sector with a government that 
is acting to maximize the welfare of a single median voter. Second, the 
initial  equilibrium  is necessarily  characterized by  existing taxes, ex- 
penditure levels, and policies regarding deductibility.  As a result, the 
analytically convenient trick of assuming zero initial taxes and expen- 
ditures cannot be used; as is well known, this complicates the differ- 
ential incidence analysis considerably. Third, in addition to the usual 
mix of prices and quantities in a general equilibrium model, state and 
local government behavior must be modeled endogenously. To examine 
the revenue mix  question, a minimum  of two tax variables  in  each 
sector is  required; again,  this  complicates  the differential  incidence 
results.  Moreover, an optimal tax problem must be formulated to de- 
termine how governments choose between taxes-in  particular, an ex- 
planation  must  be found  for why  state and local  governments use 
nonbenefit taxes on capital when, at least under certain circumstances, 
optimizing governments would  avoid such taxes entirely if  capital is 
perfectly mobile in the long run (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1983); 
one possibility is offered in the analysis below. 
The paper is organized as follows. The assumptions and structure 
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dence results are presented in  section 6.3, and numerical simulation 
results are presented in section 6.4. A brief concluding section sum- 
marizes the results and suggests directions for future research. 
6.2  The Model 
The analytical framework utilized in the paper is a two-sector general 
equilibrium model where expenditure and tax policies in each sector 
are selected to maximize the welfare of the median voter in that sector. 
The model is a highly aggregated one where the first sector represents 
a group of states where the median voter itemizes deductions for federal 
tax purposes, and the second sector represents the remaining group of 
states where the median voter is assumed to be a nonitemizer.  The 
model is designed to analyze the effects of eliminating (or reducing) 
state and local tax deductibility on the mix and levels of state and local 
revenues and on federal tax revenue, with an emphasis on the differing 
responses of the two sectors and a variety of general equilibrium effects. 
The model is constructed as follows. The fifty states and the District 
of Columbia are ranked in order of percentage of itemizers, with joint 
returns double-weighted to reflect the presence of two voters per return. 
The states are divided into two sectors indexed byj, with N*  states 
with a percentage of itemizers greater than  some cut-off percentage 
(F)  forming a sector (j  =  1) where the median voter is assumed to be 
an itemizer, and the remaining 51 -N* states forming a sector (j  = 2) 
where the median voter is a nonitemizer.’ The appropriate value of F‘ 
and thus N‘  is not entirely clear; however it is quite likely to be less 
than 50 percent if  high-income individuals are more likely to vote or 
exert more influence in the political process (see Feldstein and Metcalf 
for a discussion of the role of the median voter in expenditure deter- 
mination). Indeed, the new results presented by Lindsey (in this vol- 
ume) are the first to provide an estimate of W (29) that reflects the fact 
that high-income individuals are much more  likely to vote than are 
relatively low-income  individual^.^ In the simulations, results are pre- 
sented for N* = 19, 29, and 39; the results for N* = 19 and N’  = 39 
should bound the “true” value, with W = 29 providing the best point 
estimate. 
Within each of the two sectors (hereafter, the “itemizer”  and “non- 
itemizer”  sectors), tax and expenditure policies are assumed to be set 
to maximize the welfare of a single representative median voter. The 
responses of each sector to changes in the federal deductibility of state 
and local taxes are thus determined by the effects of the policy change 
on each sector’s median voter, subject to a sectoral government budget 
constraint. Such an approach should be viewed as suggestive since it 
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(to even a greater extent since the level of aggregation is so great). 
Nevertheless, this application of the median voter framework makes 
the general equilibrium model analytically tractable,  and focuses on 
how  state and local government responses to the elimination of de- 
ductibility depend on whether the median voter is an itemizer. 
The details of the model are as follows. The population is assumed 
to be fixed. Since most studies suggest that eliminating state and local 
deductibility is unlikely to result in  much migration even within met- 
ropolitan areas (see Gramlich 1985, Herzog and Schlottmann 1986, and 
Chernick and Reschovsky  1987), an assumption of no interstate mi- 
gration, which in turn implies no migration within the two-sector con- 
text analyzed here, seems plausible. 
Production is modeled is as simply as possible.  There is a single 
production good which is the numeraire. This single production good 
is produced  with  a Cobb-Douglas production function using a fixed 
factor (a composite of land and labor in each sector, hereafter referred 
to as labor and denoted as Lv) and capital (Kc),  with the capital share 
parameter denoted as a. (In general, total quantities in a sector will be 
denoted with a T subscript, while median voter quantities will be de- 
noted simply by the appropriate j subscript; for example, Lj refers to 
the amount of labor supplied by  the median voter in  sector j).  Con- 
structing a restricted profit function in each sector-rj(rj,  L+implies 
that capital demands (KQ)  and wages (wj)  are 
(1)  Kv  =  -rjr  (rj, L7j) 
(2)  Wj = TjL  (rj, Lfi)  9 
where the subscripts following the j subscript denote differentiation 
with respect to the arguments of the restricted profit function in sector 
j.4  The price elasticity of demand for capital is constant for the Cobb- 
Douglas production function and is denoted by  pK, 
F~ = (rj/Kv)(dKv/drj) =  -rJnjr)rjr  =  141 - a) > 0 . 
Public services are modeled as publicly provided  private goods- 
government purchases of the single production good which are shared 
equally within a sector (see Hamilton  1983 for a justification). Total 
public services are denoted as G,  and the median voter in  sectorj 
receives Gj = Gv/Nj,  where Nj is the number of households in sector 
j.  Thus, the model ignores any benefit spillovers or utility interdepen- 
dencies associated with state and local public goods, as well as any 
cost differences across jurisdictions in producing such goods. 
Capital is perfectly mobile across sectors and earns a net return r. 
The total supply of capital in the economy (K)  is fixed. The fixed factor 
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that the model thus has the hybrid long-intermediate-run characteristics 
typical of Harberger-type models; in this case, labor and the aggregate 
capital  stock are fixed as would be expected in  an intermediate-run 
model, but the allocation of capital and the tax and expenditure policies 
of the state and local governments are free to vary as would be expected 
in  a long-run model. The fixed factors in each sector are assumed to 
be locally owned, and capital ownership is assigned independently of 
jurisdiction of residence. 
The median voter in each sector has a standard utility function de- 
fined over consumption of  private and public goods-UJ(Cj,  Gj).  The 
model assumes that the tax and expenditure policies of each sector are 
set by a single government which acts to maximize the utility of the 
median voter in that sector. Each government has two tax instruments. 
The first is a personal general sales or proportional income tax rate tj 
(hereafter, all deductible personal taxes are referred to as “sales” taxes). 
There is no saving in the model and all goods are assumed to be pur- 
chased locally with no transportation costs for intersectoral sales; thus, 
sales and proportional income taxes are equivalent in the model. Since 
there is no housing in the single-good model, residential property taxes 
are not treated e~plicitly.~  (One interpretation is that housing capital 
is fixed and residential property taxes should be included in deductible 
sales tax revenues; this is the approach followed in  the simulations.) 
In the initial equilibrium, sales taxes are fully deductible against federal 
taxes for itemizem6 
The second tax instrument is the business capital income tax rate kj, 
which  reflects  nonbenefit  taxation  of  mobile capital in  the form of 
corporate income taxes or nonresidential property taxes (hereafter, the 
“capital”  tax). Capital taxes are fully deductible against federal cor- 
porate taxes, and all firms are assumed to be corporations. The only 
other source of revenue is federal grants; debt, user charges, severance 
taxes, selective sales taxes, and any other taxes are ignored. 
The response expected by each government to a change in its capital 
tax rate is a critical element of the model. Capital income is assumed 
to be subject to a fixed federal corporate tax rate (K),  with state and 
local capital taxes fully deductible against federal  taxes.’  Thus, the 
relationship between the net return to capital (r)  and the gross price of 
capital in each jurisdiction (rj)  is 
(3)  r  = rj (1 - K)(I  -  kj) . 
In setting its capital tax rate kj, each sectoral government perceives 
that an increase in  kj will  be  shifted to  some extent.  However, the 
expected extent of  shifting is not constrained to be that which would 
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the expected extent of shifting is determined (in a way that will  be 
described below) from the revenue mix in the initial equilibrium. This 
modeling approach allows the two sectoral governments (and thus im- 
plicitly  the individual jurisdictional  governments which  make up the 
two sectors) to differ in the extent to which they expect capital taxes 
to be shifted. This in turn allows the model to be consistent with the 
results presented by Lindsey (in this volume) which indicate that high- 
income states raise a higher amount of tax revenue per dollar of per- 
sonal income (relative to low-income states) but that the extra revenue 
comes from relatively  high  business  taxes rather than  high personal 
taxes; one explanation for this phenomenon offered by Lindsey is that 
the high-income  states expect that business firms are relatively  im- 
mobile  and that capital  can be taxed relatively  heavily.  Within  the 
context of the model in this paper, this interpretation would imply that 
the expected extent of shifting of capital taxes in the relatively high 
income itemizer sector would be greater than that in the relatively low 
income nonitemizer sector; this is indeed the pattern observed in the 
numerical simulation results reported below. 
This expected or perceived  extent of shifting of taxes on capital is 
modeled as a  “gross”  shifting parameter (pW)  which equals the ex- 
pected percentage  change in the gross price of capital in response to 
a change in k,-taking  into account any expected reactions by other 
governments-or 
pGj = (drj/dkj)/rj . 
This definition implies the associated “net”  shifting parameter (pN) 
pNj = (dr/dk,)/r  = pGj - 1/(1 -  kj)  . 
An expectation of full shifting by capital implies pNj = 0 or pGj =  I/ 
(1 - kj),  while  an  expectation  of  no  shifting  implies  pG, = 0  or 
pNj =  -l/(l  - kj).  Thus, the expected ranges  for these perception 
parameters are 
0 5 pGj  5 1/(1 -  kj) 
-  1/(1  - k,)  9 pNj 9 0 . 
As is shown in section 6.4,  the initial values of these shifting parameters 
can be inferred from the mix of sales and capital taxes observed in the 
initial equilibrium. To  calculate the new equilibrium, some assumption 
must be made regarding the behavior of these perception parameters. 
I assume that each government expects the degree of shifting, as mea- 
sured by  the negative  effect of its capital taxes on the net return to 
capital, to be constant-that  is, pNj  is assumed to be constant. This in 
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return to capital (a larger pGj)  as the extent of capital taxation increases 
Thus, each sectoral government’s optimization problem is to select 
kj and  tj to maximize  Uj(Cj,  Gj)  subject to the constraint  that total 
revenues cover own-expenditures on public  services. Values of  pNj 
calculated in the initial equilibrium are used to calculate the equilibrium 
values of the endogenous capital tax rates when the extent of deduct- 
ibility is altered by the federal government (as described in the following 
paragraph). 
The federal government collects revenue from corporate and per- 
sonal income taxes. Corporate taxes are assessed on capital income at 
a constant rate  K, and all  state and local capital taxes paid are fully 
deductible.  Personal  income  taxes have  progressive  marginal rates, 
with a fraction c$ of state and local sales taxes deductible for itemizers; 
c$  =  1  in the initial equilibrium. The personal tax system is modeled 
as a multibracket  structure where a constant marginal tax rate is as- 
sessed on income above an exemption amount in  each bracket. For 
example, for the median voter in  sectorj, total personal  income tax 
payments (Tj) are 
(4) 
where  Y,  is gross income, Zj is the exemption amount, and 87,  is the 
marginal tax  rate  with  8 = 1 in  the  initial equilibrium.  The reform 
proposal analyzed  is the reduction  of  deductibility  of  sales taxes (a 
lowering of c$), coupled with an equal percentage reduction in marginal 
rates (a lowering of  O), subject to a fixed federal revenue constraint; 
the case where  c$  is reduced to zero corresponds to complete elimi- 
nation of deductibility of personal sales taxes. 
To  simplify considerably the analysis of  the government’s optimi- 
zation problem as well as the differential incidence results, I assume 
that the median voter’s income (  yi) is derived purely from labor income 
(Y, = wjLj);s  since median voter income in  the simulations is always 
$20,000 or less, this assumption is not too ~nreasonable.~  Gross ex- 
penditures on consumption for the median voter (1 + tj)Cj  is equal to 
Y, -  TJ which implies consumption of 
(5) 
Total sales tax revenues (R,)  are 
(apcjlakj =  141 -  kj)* > 0). 
Tj = OTj [Y, - zj -  c$  (tjCj)]  , 
cj = [(l -  OTj)yi + OTjZj]/[l  + (1 -  c$OTj)?,1  . 
(6)  RCj  = tjC,  = tjNjC,/pj , 
where C,  is total  consumption  and  pj  is  the  ratio of  median  voter 
consumption to consumption per household  (p,  = Cj/(Cq/Nj)),  while 
total capital tax revenues (RKj) are 
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Denoting lump-sum grants by  Sj and assuming a matching rate of  mj 
for matching grants implies total government services of 
(8)  Gq = (R, + R,  + Sj)/(l - mj) , 
with government services provided to the median voter (Gj)  equal to 
Gq/Nj.lo  Note that equations (4)  and (8) can be combined to yield 
(9)  Cj f [(I  -  WTj>Pj(l - mj)IGj 
= [(l -  +T~)YJ + @rjZj] + (1 -  +@rj)Pj(Sj + kjrjKTj)/Nj 
or 
(10) 
where P,  is the effective price of  government services faced by the 
median voter in sectorj  and, following Craig and Inman (1985),  Ye  is 
that individual’s “full fiscal income,” which includes the value of  hi.s 
share of capital tax revenue and federal revenue sharing. 
Given these assumptions, the two-sector general equilibrium model 
is described by  a system of  six equations as follows. The first two 
equations are the first-order conditions for the sales tax rates tj. The 
government assumes that Pj is constant.  ‘I Substituting from (5)  and (8) 
into Uj(Cj,  Gj),  differentiating with respect to tj, and setting the result 
equal to zero yields the expected result that the marginal rate of  sub- 
stitution of the median voter equals the effective price ratio of gov- 
ernment services to private consumption goods. 
cj  + PGjCj  = Yo  , 
(1 1)  UjJUjc = (1 -  +&j)(l  - mj)pj,  j  =  1, 2 . 
Note that since + = 0 for the median voter in the nonitemizer sector, 
the relative price of government services reduces to 
(12) 
The next two equations are the first-order conditions for the capital 
tax rates  kj. Differentiating  Uj(Cj,  Cj)  with respect to kj, setting the 
result equal to zero, substituting from (1 l), and using the definition of 
the shifting perception parameter bGj  yields 
(13) 
pc2  = (1 - m*)Pz . 
dUj/dkj =  -aj (1 - hj)kGj  + (1 -  @hj)Pj 
11 -  kjkGjkK + kjkGj1  = 0  7 
where aj = Lj/(Lu/Nj)  is the ratio of labor supply of the median voter 
to per capita labor supply in the sector. This expression indicates that 
raising the capital tax rate has two primary effects on the welfare of 
the median voter. The first term reflects the loss from reduced wage 
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of  the fixed factor, thus lowering both private consumption and gov- 
ernment services (because of  lower  sales tax  receipts). The second 
term reflects the net effect of raising capital tax rates on capital tax 
revenues R,,  and has three components as reflected by the three terms 
in the brackets. The first is the positive revenue effect of the higher 
tax rate, the second is the negative effect of the loss of  capital, and 
the third is the positive effect of an increase in the gross price of capital; 
since (JI~  - 1) = a/(] -  a) > 0, the second effect dominates the third 
and the tax base declines unambiguously. Increasing kj thus involves 
balancing the gains from greater expropriation of capital income with 
a higher tax rate against the losses from (1)  a reduction in the capital 
income tax base, and (2) the associated reduction in consumption and 
sales tax revenues due to the lower wages caused by capital emigration. 
Thus, the revenue mix chosen by  the government can be viewed as a 
two-step process, where the capital tax rate is chosen to expropriate 
the income of capital owners to the optimal extent, and then the sales 
tax rate is chosen to allocate optimally the sector’s resources across 
public and private uses. 
Rearranging equation (13) and noting that 4 = 0 forj = 2 yields the 
expressions for the capital tax rates in the two sectors 
(14)  kl = (kK - I)-’ (aI/pI)  { wa2  - JI~~)/JI~~ 
+ “1  - 4WI/(l - 407I)l) 
(15)  k2 = (JIK -  (az/P2) [(P2/a2  - PC~)/PCZ  + 0721 ; 
note that the second term in  (14) drops out in  the initial equilibrium. 
These expressions indicate that the capital tax rates are inversely re- 
lated to the perceived shifting parameters (kCj).  Moreover, the extent 
of deductibility (4) plays a critical role. For sector one, a reduction in 
4 increases the capital tax rate; that is, as stressed by  Feldstein and 
Metcalf, reducing the deductibility of personal sales taxes makes their 
use relatively less attractive and results in increased reliance on de- 
ductible business  capital taxes. However, since personal  sales taxes 
are not  deductible in  the  initial equilibrium for the median voter  in 
sector two, k2 is initially high (relative to the case where the median 
voter is an itemizer) to reflect a preference for deductible capital taxes. 
The fifth equation reflects the fixed national capital stock assumption 
(16)  K - KT1  - Kn  = K  +  TI,  +  ~2~  = 0. 
Note that the shifting perception parameters are used only to determine 
the tax and expenditure policies of the sectoral governments; the capital 
market equilibrium equation reflects perfect capital mobility in the long 
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The final equation in the general equilibrium  system is the federal 
government budget  constraint. Assuming that federal revenue net of 
grants (R)  is fixed yields 
+  Kr,{l  - kj)Kq - mjCq - Sj], 
where revenue sharing and the matching rates are assumed to be held 
constant, and yyj  and ycj  are multipliers which convert median voter 
personal income taxes (net of sales tax deductions) and sales tax de- 
ductions to the analogous  quantities  for the entire sector. The as- 
sumption of fixed federal revenue multipliers is made only to facilitate 
the differential incidence calculations, and is relaxed in the simulations 
where federal revenue effects are calculated explicitly. Note that in this 
formulation, federal matching grants are assumed to change when state 
and local revenues change although one could also assume that such 
grants are simply held constant; both approaches are analyzed in the 
simulations. 
Thus, the model  has a single exogenous variable + (the extent of 
deductibility of  state and local personal  taxes), and six  endogenous 
variables-r,,  c2,  k,,  k2,  r,  and 8 (which reflects the reduction in marginal 
tax rates made possible from the reduction or elimination of state and 
local tax deductibility). 
6.3  Differential Incidence Results 
The differential  incidence results for the model are presented in a 
slightly unconventional format. Calculating expressions for the changes 
in the endogenous variables with respect to a change in the exogenous 
variable + would be extremely  cumbersome. Instead, the equations 
shown below separate the responses of various endogenous variables 
to changes in the two federal government instruments (+ and €I),  and 
a  final differential  incidence  equation calculates the endogenous re- 
sponse of 8 (the reduction in marginal tax rates) to a change in + (a 
reduction in the extent of state and local tax deductibility). Thus, the 
general form of the differential incidence expressions is 
.2 = (+)  qz+ (-4) + (+)qZ"(-i)  7 
where the ''*"  denotes logarithmic differentiation, and the expressions 
for the elasticities qzm  and qze are defined so they are either unambig- 
uously positive or positive for plausible parameter values. All expres- 
sions are evaluated at the initial equilibrium (+  = 8 = 1). The explanation 
assumes that reducing deductibility (d+ < 0) raises revenue, which in 
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Differentiating (14) yields 
(18)  RI  = qkl+ (-4)  > O?  (qr(lH  = 0)  9 
where 
>O. 
[ (1 - a)/al(ai/Pi)  [Ti/(1  - Ti)l/ki 
1 + [(I  -  aYa1 [PGdl -  kJk2 
qhl+ = 
Thus, reducing deductibility unambiguously increases the sector one 
capital tax rate, as the government substitutes away from now partially 
deductible  sales taxes to fully deductible capital  taxes. In contrast, 
differentiating (15) yields 
(19)  Iz2  = -  qk2H  (-i)  < O?  (qk2+ = O)  9 
where 
Thus, reducing deductibility unambiguously causes a decrease in  the 
use of  capital taxes in  sector two. This occurs because the reduction 
in marginal tax rates which accompanies the reduction in deductibility 
increases the after-tax cost of  reducing wages by  driving out capital 
with high tax rates. In sector one, this cost increase is more than offset 
by the fact that reducing deductibility makes the use of non-sales  taxes 
relatively  more  attractive  to the  median  voter; this force  does  not 
operate in  sector two where the median voter is a nonitemizer. 
These two changes in capital tax rates have opposing effects on the 
net return to capital, as can be seen by differentiating equation (16) 
which yields 
where  A]  = Kq/K is the fraction of  the fixed capital stock initially in 
sectorj. The net result depends on the relative magnitudes of the two 
effects, but generally one would expect the direct effect from the re- 
duction in + to outweigh the feedback effect from the reduction in 8; 
this implies a net increase in the average rate of taxation of capital in 
the economy which, in  a Harberger-type fixed capital  stock general 
equilibrium model, would be expected to be largely borne by capital. 
Differentiating equation (3) yields the effects on the gross prices of 
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which indicate that the gross price of capital unambiguously increases 
(decreases) in  sector one (two) where  the capital  tax  rate  is  rising 
(falling). As a result,  the capital  stock in sector one unambiguously 
declines while the capital stock in sector two unambiguously increases, 
as can be seen from differentiating (1) to yield 
(23)  K,, =  -PK~  < 0 
(24)  Kn  = PKi2 >  O  . 
Calculation of the changes in  the sales tax rates is somewhat more 
involved. Since by assumption median voter income is derived solely 
from returns to the fixed factor (  yj = wLJ, calculation of the changes 
in  median voter gross income follows  straightforwardly from differ- 






Thus, median voter gross income unambiguously decreases in sector 
one, as wages fall in response to the outflow of capital induced by both 
the increase in the capital tax rate in  sector one and the reduction in 
the capital tax rate in sector two; the opposing effects occur in sector 
two. 
Differentiating equation (9,  holding t,  constant, and substituting from 
equation (25) yields the change in income net of federal taxes (YNj  = 
(  1 +  tj)Cj) 
(27) 
where the E notation indicates a partial elasticity holding the sales tax 
rate constant and 
YNl  =  -EYNl+  (-44  + EYNl" (-6)  3 
EYNI+ = qyl+ (1 -  TI)YI/[(~ -  TI)YI + 'TIZI]  + Tifi/[l  + (1 - 71)f  11 
EYNIH = [TI(YI -  ZI) -  qvltl(1 -  Tl)Y1]/[(1  -  T~)YI  + 71211 -  T1fl/ 
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The eYNI+  expression reflects the reduction in net income due to lower 
wages and the reduction in sales tax deductions. The eyNlH  expression 
reflects the increase in net income due to the reduction in marginal tax 
rates, which is offset by the reduction in wage income (due to capital 
outflow caused by the reduction in k2)  and the reduced values of the 
remaining sales tax deductions due to the reduction in 0. 
(28) 
where 
Similarly, in sector two, 
tv2 = EYN2+( -  44  + EYN2e( -  6) 7 
EYN~+  = qlkz+ (1 -  72)y2/[1 -  72)y2 -k  72221 
EYN~  = [Tne(1 -  Tz)Y2  72(y2 -  z2)1/[1 -  72)  y2 + 72221 9 
with the terms in eYN2+  and E~~~~  reflecting increases in net income due 
to wage increases caused by the increase in kl and the reduction in k2, 
and the increase in net income due to the reduction in 8. Substituting 
these expressions into the results of differentiating equation (5) yields 
the changes in consumption which are 
(29)  =  -+I+(-+)  + EclH(-i)  -  ((1  - 71)fl/[l  + (1 -  71)fll)if 
(30) 
equation (9) which yields 
c2  = EYN2*( -  4)  + EYN20( -  6) -  [t2/(1 + f21li2 . 
Price  changes follow directly from differentiating the P,  term in 
(31)  PGI = [TI/(]  -  TI)](-+  - 6) = r)p~~(-$  - 6) > 0 
(32)  PG2 = 0, 
as  the price of government services rises unambiguously for the median 
voter who itemizes, but is constant for the nonitemizing median voter. 
The response of capital tax revenues must be obtained in order to 
calculate the change in government services provided  to the median 
voter. Differentiating equation (7) yields 
(33) 
where 
&I  = TRKl*(-+)  -  rlRKle(-O)  > 
qRKl+ =  - [a/(l - a)]  [kl/(l  -  kl)lA2hKl+ > 
qRKie = [a/(] - all  [k241 -  kz)lh2qKa > 0  9 
indicating that capital tax revenues in sector one increase as a result 
of the increase in kl (for any reasonable parameter values-e.g., a < 0.5 
and kl < 0.5 is a sufficient condition) but decrease because the reduc- 
tion in k2 causes an outflow of capital from sector one. Differentiating 
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(34)  GI  = (-SCIECl+  + sKIT)RK14)(-$) 
+ (ScIEcIa -  SKiqRKle)(-e) 
+ {s~,/[l  + (1 -  T~)fil)ii, 
where scj  and sKj are the shares of  sales and capital tax revenues in 
funds other than matching grants in sectorj; that is, scj  = fjCn/[(l - 
mi) GTj]  and sKj = kjrjKTi/[(l -  mj) GV]. 
Performing the analogous calculations in sector two yields 
(35)  RKZ = qRKZ+( -  $1 -  qRKZe( -  4) 2 
where 
qRKZ+ = [a/(1 -  rkI/(l  -  kl)lXlqKl+ > 
qRK2e = (1 - [dl  - a)]  [kAl -  k2)lhlIqKze > 0  7 
indicating that capital tax revenues fall in sector two because of the 
reduction in k2 but rise because of  the inflow of capital caused by the 
increase in k,. Substituting into the result of  differentiating (8) yields 
(36)  62  = ( -  SCZEYN2*  + SKZr)RKZ+)( -  $1  + (SCZEYNZe 
-  sK2qRK2~)  (-6)  + [sC2/(1  + t2>liz  . 
These results permit calculation of the change in the sales tax rates. 
Differentiating equation (1 1) and using the Slutsky equation as well as 
equation (32) yields the standard results 
(37)  PG~I  -  PCY~G  - (PGPGl/ecl>PGl = 0 
PGdZ  - PcnG = 0  9  (38) 
where kcvi  and pGvi  are the income elasticities of demand (with respect 
to full fiscal income  Ye) for private and public services, F~~~~  is the 
compensated price elasticity of demand for public services in  sector 
one, and  ecj is the share of full fiscal income spent on private con- 
sumption. Substituting from (29), (31), (34) and solving for the change 
in t,  yields 
where 
(39)  =  -%I+(-$)  + qrle(-e)  9 
qrl+ = {~wvi+  (~Gyi  - ~cuisci)  + ~CyisKiqRKi+ 
+ (PGPGl/eCl)  [71/(1 -  71)1}/01 
qrle = {~y~le  (PGYI  -  CLCY~SCI) 
+ kYlSKlqRKle -  (kPGl/eC1)[~1/(1 - 71)1}/o1 
D,  = [PGY1(1 -  71)fI  + kYISCll/[l  + (1 -  71)  fll > 0 . 
These results are interpreted as follows. For qtl+,  the first term indicates 
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effect which causes demand for government services to fall, with this 
effect tempered by the need to maintain the sales tax share of revenues 
in  light of  declining consumption; (2) declines because of a “revenue 
mix effect” which results in a shift to capital taxation; and (3)  declines 
because the increase in the relative price of  government services re- 
duces demand. For qtlH,  the sales tax rate tl (1) increases because the 
reduction in  marginal tax rates causes net income to increase, (2) in- 
creases (mitigating the analogous revenue mix effect above) because 
the decrease in k2 causes capital tax revenues to fall since capital leaves 
sector one, and (3)  decreases since the reduction in 8 also increases 
the relative price of government services in sector one and thus reduces 
demand. Although the net effect is ambiguous, it is likely that income 
effects of the reduction in +, the revenue mix effect in sector one, and 
the price effects will dominate the negative effects so that the sales tax 
rate in  sector one declines. 
The analogous derivation in sector two yields 
(40) 
where 
i2 = rlt2*(-4)  + rl,2e(-&  9 
rlt2*  = [EYN2JCLG)? - PcnSc2) -  PCY2SK2rlRK2*l/D2 
D2 = (PcY2f2 +  tJ-cnSc2)/(1  + t2) > 0 . 
r]r2e =  [EYN2e(kn - k?VZSC2) + kY2sK2rlRK2HI/D2 
The interpretation of these results is analogous to that above; note that 
both net income effects are positive, the capital tax revenue effects 
imply an increase in t2 due to the revenue mix effect in sector two (k2 
falls) but a reduction due to the increase in kl and the resulting increase 
in  KR,  and there are no price effects since the price of  government 
services facing the nonitemizing median voter is unchanged. 
Given the expressions for the changes in the four tax rate variables 
and the net return to capital, the changes in consumption and govern- 
ment service levels can be derived. Differentiating the definition of full 
fiscal income YFI,  holding PGI  constant, yields 
(41) 
where 
YFI  =  -€  YFl+(-4)  + EYFle(-&  9 
EYFl*  = kYNI*SCI[1  + (1 - 71)  tll  -SKIrlRKI+(l  -  71)flV 
EyFle  = {EYN~~SCI[I  + (1 -  71)  tll  -sKi~)RKi&1 -  71)fiY 
{[I  + (1 - ~1)tllDJ 
{[I  + (1 - ~1)fIlDl)  * 
Thus, there are four effects on full fiscal income in sector one. Reducing 
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cause wages decline, but increases it through a positive +-revenue mix 
effect because additional capital tax revenues are raised; the associated 
reduction in marginal tax rates directly increases YFI  through a positive 
&net income effect but also reduces it through a negative &revenue 
mix effect due to the reduction in k2 which causes an outflow of capital 
from sector one and thus reduces wages. The net effect is ambiguous, 
but is likely to be negative. 
Similarly, 
(42)  = qYF24(-6)  + qyRH(-i)  9 
where 
quF2+ = [EYN2+SC2(1  +  f2) + f2SK2TRKZ*l/[(l  + f2P21 ’  0 
qYRH = [EYN20SC2(1  +  f2) - f2SK2r)RK201/[(1 +  f2)D21 . 
Thus, both the +-net income and &net income effects are positive on 
full  fiscal  income  in  sector two, while  the +-revenue  mix  effect  is 
positive (the increase in  k, drives capital to sector two and increases 
wages) and the &revenue mix  effect is negative (the reduction  in  k2 
reduces full fiscal income). 
Substituting into (29-30)  from (39) and (40-42)  yields the changes 
in consumption and government services broken down into the appro- 





where  p.cpcI  is the compensated cross-price elasticity of demand for 
consumption with respect to the price of government services for the 
median voter in sector one. Assuming that the first term in brackets in 
(43) outweighs the second, the net income effects operate to reduce 
(increase) public and private consumption in sector one (two), while 
the substitution effects in sector one increase the relative demand for 
private goods. 
The changes in sales tax revenues are obtained by substituting equa- 
tions (39-40), (43), and (45) into equation (6) which yields 
el  =  PcYl[-EYFlm  (-6)  + EYFle(-&l  +  PLCPGIqPGI(-6-& 
GI  = PGYl[-E*FI+(-6)  +  +FIR(-@)]  - CLGPGlT)PGI(-4-~) 
t2  = Pcn[EYR*(-6)  + EYRe(-&I 
62  = PGY2[EYF2+(-6)  + EYRd4)l  7 
(47)  RCI  =  -T)RCI+(-$)  + qRCle(-6)  ? 
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and 
(48)  Rc2 = ~)Rci+(-+) + TR~H(-~)  7 
where 
T)RC2+ = [k?rZ(l + f2)  EYN2+ - I"Cn sK2  ?RK2+1/[(1  + f2)D21 
TRC~H  = [k?n(l  + f2kYN2~  +  PcYzSKZT)RK~H~/[~(~  + f2)D2J. 
The interpretation of the income, revenue mix, and price effects on 
sales tax revenues is analogous to the description of effects on sales 
tax rates above. 
Finally, differentiation of the federal government budget constraint 
yields the reduction in marginal tax rates (0) in response to the reduction 
in deductibility. Differentiating equation (1 7) yields 
(49)  -fclGl  -  fG2G2  + fYIfN1 
+ fnfm -  fci [&I  - (-6)J -  fc2[&2 
- (-6)J  + fKI  RFKI  + fK2kFK2 = 0 I 
where  TNj = 07,(Y,  - 2,)  is federal personal  income taxes paid  ne- 
glecting sales tax deductions in each sector, and R,  = KT,(~  -  k,)K, 
is federal corporate tax revenues paid in each sector. To solve for the 
changes in  TN, differentiate the definition and substitute from equations 
(25-26)  to yield 
(50) 
(51) 
fN1  =  -[Y1/(Y, -  Zl)lrlYl+ (-4) 
fN2 =  -[YAY2 -  Z2)l qvrJ-4) 
-  +  [yI/(yI  -  Zl)lqYIH)  (-& 
-  (1 -  [Y2/(YZ -  Z2)lqne) (-6). 
Differentiating the definition of R,  and substituting from equations 
(18-24)  yields 
(52)  Rmi  =  -qRFKi+  (-4)  -  %?FKi+  (-6) < o 
qRFKl+ =  + (FK - 1)A2l[kl/(1 -  kl)hKl+ > 0 
rlRFKl0 = (P-K - lh2  [k241 -  Mlqk2e > 0 
(53)  RFK2 = qRFKZ+ ( -  4)  + qRFK2H ( - 
qRFK29 = (PK  - 1)Ai[ki/(l - kl)Jqkl+ > 0 
qk'FK7.H  =  + (FK - 1)All[k2/(1 -  k2)lqk2H  >  O, 196  George R. Zodrow 
which indicates that federal corporate revenues decline because of the 
increased use of capital taxation in sector one, but increase because 
of the reduction in the use of capital taxation in sector two. 




(-8)  = rle(-&  = (l-lWhl,&-4)  9 
qen = [~GIPGY~VYTI~ -  f~z~GnqYn+  + ~GIPGPGI~PGI] 
-  {fYl[YI/(Yl  -  Z,)lTYlrn -  fn[Y2/(Y2  -  Z2)Iqnm) 
+ [fCI%?CI+  -  fCZrlRCZ+I -  [fKIWKI+ -  fK2r)RFK2+1 
+ fYd1 + [YI/(Y, -  ZJlrlYle) + fn  (1 - [Y2/(Y2  -  Z2)Iqne) 
+ fClrlRCl, + fC27lRC2ll + fKlrlRFKl0 -  fK2rlRFK2tr . 
Ted = fGI~”’GYlqmle  + ~LcLG~vYR~  -  ~G~FGPGI~PGI 
The terms in  qen  indicate  that, in  each case, the effects on federal 
revenue due to changes in sector one are offset by analogous effects 
of opposite sign in sector two; the expression qed  is positive for any 
reasonable parameter values. 
This general equilibrium multiplier for the reduction in marginal tax 
rates made possible by the elimination of deductibility can be compared 
to the analogous multiplier in the static case where revenue mix and 
general equilibrium effects are not considered. Although “static” could 
be defined  in  a variety  of ways, suppose the static estimate simply 
ignores all changes in revenue mix, income, and consumption. In this 
case, the multiplier analgous to q, is 
(55) 
A comparison of E,  and q,, assuming E,  > q,,, indicates the extent to 
which a static revenue estimate, in the specific sense defined above, 
overestimates the increase in federal revenues due to the elimination 
of state and local tax deductibility. 
E,  = (fCl + fCJ(fVl + fn)  . 
6.4  Simulation Results 
Numerical simulation results with a version of the model described 
in section 6.2 are presented in this section. Since the model is fairly 
primitive and ignores a large number of features which would be in- 
cluded in a more complete representation of the U.S. economy, these 
results should be viewed as merely suggestive of the potential impor- 
tance of the revenue and general equilibrium effects emphasized in the 
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The primary  source of information was the data set on 1983 state 
personal  income and  sales taxes  compiled  by  Daniel Feenberg and 
Harvey Rosen (1986) which the authors generously made available to 
me. Additional data was obtained primarily from various publications 
of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 
To determine the division of  the fifty states and the District of Co- 
lumbia into the itemizer and nonitemizer sectors, the states were ranked 
in decreasing order of percentage of itemizers, with joint returns dou- 
ble-weighted to reflect the presence of two voters; the percentage of 
itemizers varied from a high of 55.2 percent in Utah to a low of  19.9 
percent in South Dakota. As discussed above, results are reported for 
N* = 19, 29, and 39; the results presented by Lindsey (in this volume) 
suggest that N* = 29  should be viewed as the best point estimate.I2 
For a given N',  states 1 through N' were aggregated to form sector 
one (the itemizer sector), and states N'  +  1 through 51 were aggregated 
to form sector two (the nonitemizer sector). 
The Feenberg-Rosen state and local data were divided into five ad- 
justed  gross  income  (AGI) brackets  ($0-$10,000; $10,000-$15,000; 
$15,000-$20,000;  $20,000-$30,000; and > $30,000) indexed by  6. As 
indicated in equation (4),  data on marginal and average tax rates were 
used to construct marginal tax rates (TJ  and exemption/deduction to- 
tals, net of sales tax deductions, for each bracket in  the two sectors 
(2,).  Individuals are assumed to stay in the same income brackets, so 
that all changes in the personal tax structure are captured by changes 
in the 8 variable. The value of the total nonresidential nonfarm capital 
stock in  1983 was determined from data on tangible asset holdings 
reported in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1986). 
Capital owners were assumed to receive a current net return of r = 0.04, 
and capital was allocated across states in proportion to the shares of 
nonresidential nonfarm property tax base reported in Advisory Com- 
mission on Intergovermental Relations (1986)-hereafter,  ACIR (1986). 
Returns to capital were assumed to accrue entirely to individuals in 
the top two income brackets, with 81 percent of capital income assumed 
to be earned by  individuals in  the $30,000 and above class.'3 The re- 
mainder of AGI was attributed to earnings of the fixed factor (labor). 
The determination of the sectoral tax rates in the initial equilibrium 
required a division of total property tax revenues into nonresidential 
and  residential  components.  Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and  Poterba 
(1983) note that the correct way to perform this division is uncertain 
and argue that calculations which assume that the effective tax rate on 
nonresidential property ranges from one-third to three times the effec- 
tive rate on residential property should bound the true value. Since I 
wish to emphasize the role of state and local capital taxation, and since 
Netzer's (1985) comments suggest that a value in the upper portion of 
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rate on nonresidential property is the upper bound of  the range sug- 
gested by Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba-three  times that on 
residential property. The land component of these taxes is eliminated, 
assuming that it is proportional to the total land value reported in the 
Federal Reserve Board publication cited above. Data on tax bases and 
property taxes paid are from ACIR (1986). 
Given this allocation of the property taxes paid, residential property 
taxes are included with general sales and personal income taxes and 
treated as deductible personal taxes, referred to in the text simply as 
sales taxes. State and local taxes are assumed to be proportional, so 
the sales tax rate in each sector (tj)  is calculated simply as an average 
tax rate; note however  that the calculated  rates are high  in that no 
attempt is made to impute rents on owner-occupied housing and include 
them in gross income, even though residential property taxes paid are 
included in “sales”  taxes. 
The sectoral capital tax  rates are also calculated assuming a pro- 
portional tax structure, where total “capital”  taxes paid are the sum 
of nonresidential property taxes (excluding the land component), cor- 
porate income taxes, and corporate licenses, where data on the last 
two items are also obtained from ACIR (1986). Given the assumption 
regarding the split between residential and nonresidential property taxes 
described above, these tax rates are relatively high; however, note that 
no attempt was made to include the business capital share of selective 
excises, user charges, severance taxes, etc. 
The calculations of the gross prices of capital, as specified in equation 
(3), and the value of the capital share parameter a in the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, require a value for the corporate tax rate. Since 
my primary concern is the federal revenue effect of changes in business 
taxes which are deductible at the statutory corporate tax rate, I simply 
assume that  K is the statutory rate in  1983  (K  = 0.46); this implies a 
nonresidential capital share of a = 0.18. 
No attempt is made to account for other sources of state and local 
revenue, including user charges, selective excise taxes, gift and estate 
taxes, and  severance taxes, as well  as the land portion of  business 
property taxes. The revenues that are included in state and local sales 
and capital taxes in the model represent roughly 60 percent of all state 
and local revenues. 
The median  voter  was  simply assumed to be  the  median  income 
taxpayer for each sector. The utility function of the median voter is 
assumed to be a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, with 
an elasticity of substitution equal to 0.5. This implies an uncompensated 
price elasticity of demand of  0.5-toward  the middle or upper portion 
of the range of  published estimates (see Inman 1979, Ladd 1984, and 
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of assuming a unitary income elasticity, which is higher than that sug- 
gested by the literature; accordingly, the changes in government service 
demands are overstated in  sector two (which gains income) but un- 
derstated in  sector one (which loses income). 
Information on federal grants is obtained from Advisory Commission 
on  Intergovernmental  Relations  (I  985b), where  revenue  sharing is 
treated as lump-sum grants (Sj),  and the remaining grants are treated 
as matching grants. To obtain realistic matching rates, the grants amount 
is reduced by the proportion of  tax revenues which are not included 
in  the above  determinations of  sales taxes and  capital  taxes.  Total 
federal  tax  revenue  is  calculated using an  expression  analogous  to 
equation (17) except that equation (4) is used to calculate explicitly 
federal personal income taxes paid for each bracket in the two sectors; 
the fraction of itemizers in each bracket is determined from the Feen- 
berg-Rosen  data,  and  is  assumed  to  be  constant  throughout  the 
simulations. 
In the initial equilibrium, + = 8 =  1. The calculated initial values 
of the tax rates and other variables and parameters are substituted into 
equation (1  1)  for j  =  1, 2 to solve for the values of  the distributive 
share parameters in the CES utility functions (which differ across the 
two sectors), and into equations (14-15)  to solve for the values of the 
two “net shifting” perception parameters kNj.I4  (Equations (16-  17) are 
satisfied by construction in the initial equilibrium.) These values are 
then used to calculate new equilibria in response to exogenous reduc- 
tions in the extent of state and local tax deductibility (+). 
Three sets of  results are presented. The first set corresponds to an 
equilibrium situation where the government institutes the reduction in 
8 predicted by the static revenue described above and runs a deficit if 
revenues are insufficient. Matching grants are assumed to be constant 
for this calculation. These results are presented in tables 6.  lax,  where 
the three cases described above (N’ = 29, 19, 39) are considered. The 
values for N‘  = 29 provide the best estimates, while the values for N* 
= 19 and N* = 39 provide reasonable bounds for the various quantities 
listed. 
Several features of  the results are common to all  three  cases. In 
terms of  tax rates, the sector one revenue mix changes drastically as 
kl increases by 43 percent (41, 47) for N” = 29 (19, 39) and tl  falls by 
30  percent (29, 32). The revenue mix in sector two changes less dra- 
matically in  the opposite direction, as k2 falls by  11%  (10, 14) and t2 
increases by  5%  (5, 9). The effects on revenues are of  course quite 
different in the three cases. When N* = 29, the changes in total state 
and local capital and sales tax revenues due to changes in the sector 
one tax rates are offset by roughly 10-12  percent because of changes 
in the opposite direction in sector two. For example, RKI  increases by 200  George R. Zodrow 
Table 6.1~  Equilibrium Effects of  Eliminating Deductibility 
N*  =29, “Static” 0, Grants Constant 
Variable  +=O:  j=1  j=2  +=I:  j=r  j=2 
Capital tax rates  0.211  0.157  0.302  0.139 
Sales tax rates  0.132  0.095  0.092  0.100 
Gross wages  0.944  0.958  0.931  0.975 
Capital fractions  0.577  0.423  0.534  0.466 
Net return to capital  0.040  0.040  0.038  0.038 
Tax rate variable 0  1.000  1.000  0.898  0.898 




State/Local Tax Revenue 
Sales tax revenue 
Capital tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
Federal Tax Revenue 
Personal tax revenue 
Corporate tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 




-  14.8 
-  1.4 
-  9.6 






-  1.9 
2.  I 
0.2 
-  1.7 
-  8.8 
-  29.6 
15.9 
-  13.7 
-  3.3 
-7.5 
-  10.8 
Nores: All revenue figures in tables are in billions of  1983 dollars; details may not add 
due to rounding. Predicted revenue gain is $28.6 billion. 
Table 6.lb  Equilibrium Effects of  Eliminating Deductibility N*  =  19, 
“Static” 0, Grants Constant 
Variable  +=O:  j=l  j=2  +=I:  j=l  j=2 
Capital tax rates  0.219  0.164  0.308  0.147 
Sales tax rates  0.142  0.097  0.101  0.102 
Gross wages  0.942  0.956  0.925  0.968 
Capital fractions  0.431  0.569  0.390  0.610 
Net return to capital  0.040  0.040  0.039  0.039 





State/Local Tax Revenue 
Sales tax revenue 
Capital tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
Federal Tax Revenue 
Personal tax revenue 
Corporate tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
Change for j=  I  Change for  j=2  Net Change 




-  12.3 
0.3 
-7.3 









-  1.7 




-  2.2 
-  4.9 
-7.1 
Notes: All revenue figures in tables are in billions of  1983 dollars; details may not add 
due to rounding. Predicted revenue gain is $28.7 billion. 201  Eliminating State and Local Tax Deductibility 
Table 6.lc  Equilibrium Effects of  Eliminating Deductibility 
N*  =39, “Static” 0, Grants Constant 
Variable  +=O:  j=1  j=2  +=I:  j=]  j=  2 
Capital tax rates  0.200  0.138  0.294  0.1  18 
Sales tax rates  0.125  0.079  0.085  0.086 
Gross wages  0.947  0.963  0.941  0.987 
Capital fractions  0.803  0.197  0.774  0.226 
Net return to capital  0.040  0.040  0.036  0.036 
Tax rate variable tl  1.Ooo  1.000  0.898  0.898 




State/Local Tax Revenue 
Sales tax revenue 
Capital tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
Federal Tax Revenue 
Personal tax revenue 
Corporate tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
-  8.9 
-44.3 
26.2 
-  18.0 
-3.6 
-  12.9 
-  16.5 
7.6 
1.6 
-  1.1 
0.6 
-  1.1 
1.3 
0.2 
-  1.2 
-  13.7 
-42.6 
25. I 
-  17.5 
-4.7 
-  11.7 
-  16.4 
Nofes:  All revenue figures in  tables are in  billions of  1983 dollars; details may not add 
due to rounding. Predicted revenue gain is $28.5 billion. 
$18.1 billion while RK2  decreases by $2.2 billion, and Rc, decreases by 
$32.9 billion while Rcz increases by $3.3 billion; total revenues fall by 
$14.8 billion in sector one while increasing in sector two by $1.1 billion 
for a net reduction in revenues of $13.7 billion. This corresponds to a 
reduction of  6.0 percent of  the portion of  own-revenues analyzed in 
the model. In contrast when N“ = 39, the sector one effects are more 
dominant, with much more dramatic effects on revenues; total capital 
tax revenues rise by $25.1 billion and total sales tax revenues fall by 
$42.6 billion for a net reduction of $17.5 billion or 7.6 percent of own- 
revenues. More modest revenue effects occur when N* = 19, with a 
total net reduction of $1  1.1 billion or 4.9 percent of own-revenues. Note 
that the reduction in own-revenues is relatively large when virtually 
all states are modeled as itemizer states, since the increase in the tax 
price of  government services is large for itemizers but zero for non- 
itemizers. Nevertheless, since the fraction of  own revenues analyzed 
is only 60 percent, the net effect on total government expenditures is 
modest, and broadly  similar to the types of  responses suggested by 
Ladd (1 984). 
In both  cases, the federal  revenue gain  predicted from the  static 
estimate (as defined above) is approximately $28.6 billion; this implies 
that 8 could be reduced from 1  .O to 0.898 without losing revenues from 
personal income taxation. Taking into account general equilibrium ef- 202  George R. Zodrow 
fects, personal tax revenues are lower in both jurisdictions because of 
the reduction in the net return to capital implied by the overall increase 
in taxation of capital (the effects of the increase in  k, dominate those 
of the decrease in k2),  and lower in sector one because of lower wages 
with the opposite effect occurring in  sector two.  The net effect is a 
reduction  in  personal  income tax  revenues of  $3.3 (2.2, 4.7)  billion 
when N* = 29 (19, 39). (Note that personal tax revenues increase in 
sector one when N = 19 because this sector has a disproportionately 
large share of itemizers.) This revenue loss is increased because cor- 
porate revenues from sector one fall because business capital taxes are 
deducted at a higher kl,  and reduced because of  the opposite effect in 
sector two. The net effect is negative in all three cases, as corporate 
revenues fall by $7.5 (4.9, 11.7) billion when N  = 29 (19, 39) as a loss 
of $9.6 billion from sector one is partially offset by a gain of $2.1 billion 
from sector two. The net effect on federal revenue when N’  = 29 (19, 
39) is a $10.8 (7.1,  16.4) billion shortfall or 38 percent (25, 58) of the 
predicted  revenue gain from eliminating deductibility. Note  that the 
revenue losses which occur as a result of general equilibrium effects 
on the net return to capital and wages are quite important, amounting 
to roughly 30 percent of the total revenue loss. 
These results suggest that the revenue  losses due to revenue mix 
and general  equilibrium effects in response to an elimination of de- 
ductibility may be quite important. The second set of results pursues 
this issue further by presenting equilibrium values of the various en- 
dogenous variables when 8 adjusts endogenously to balance the federal 
government budget. These results also assume that matching grants do 
not change in response to changes in own-financed levels of government 
service provision. 
Tables 6.2a-c present equilibrium values for various variables for the 
same three cases analyzed in  tables 6.la-c  (N’ = 29,  19, 39). When 
N = 29, the reduction in 8 financed by the elimination of deductibility 
is reduced by roughly 43 percent once revenue mix and general equi- 
librium adjustments are taken into account (8 = 0.942 rather than 0.898). 
When N = 39, the result is even more dramatic, as 65 percent of the 
reduction in marginal tax rates is eliminated, while when N = 19 only 
29 percent of the reduction is eliminated. The increases in  kl and the 
reductions in t,  are larger than in the “deficit”  case analyzed in tables 
6.1a-c because, with a smaller than expected reduction in 8, the after- 
tax cost of  reducing wages by driving out capital is reduced; for the 
same reason, the reductions in k2 and the increases in  t2 are reduced. 
The net effect of this greater reliance on capital taxation (relative to 
the deficit case) is a slightly larger reduction in the net return to capital. 
In all  three cases, KT,  falls by  roughly 4 percent, which implies an 
increase in Kn of also roughly 4 percent. The corresponding reductions 
in sector one wages and increases in sector two wages are fairly modest. 203  Eliminating State and Local Tax Deductibility 
Table 6.2a  Equilibrium Effects of  Eliminating Deductibility 
N*  =  29, 0 Endogenous, Grants Constant 
Variable  +=O:  j=I  j=2  +=I:  j=l  j=  2 
Capital tax rates  0.211  0.157  0.306  0.147 
Sales tax rates  0.132  0.095  0.090  0.098 
Gross wages  0.944  0.958  0.932  0.974 
Capital fractions  0.577  0.423  0.534  0.466 
Net return to capital  0.040  0.040  0.037  0.037 
Tax rate variable 0  1.000  1.000  0.942  0.942 
Variable  Change for j=  1  Change for  j=2  Net Change 
Income 
Labor income  -  13.0 
Capital income  - 
State/Local Tax Revenue 
Sales tax revenue  -44.3 
Capital tax revenue  26.2 
Total tax revenue  ~  18.0 
Federal Tax Revenue 
Personal tax revenue  6.0 












-  17.5 
8.5 
-  8.5 
Total tax revenue  -4.0  4. I  0.1 
Notes: All revenue figures in tables are in billions of  1983 dollars; details may not add 
due to rounding. Predicted revenue gain is $28.6 billion. 
Table 6.2b  Equilibrium Effects of Eliminating Deductibility 
N*  =  19, 0 Endogenous, Grants Constant 
Variable  +=O:  j=l  j=2  j=l  j=  2 
Capital tax rates  0.219  0.164  0.311  0.152 
Sales tax rates  0.142  0.097  0.100  0.100 
Gross wages  0.942  0.956  0.925  0.968 
Capital fractions  0.431  0.569  0.390  0.610 
Net return to capital  0.040  0.040  0.038  0.038 
Tax rate variable 0  1.OOo  1.000  0.927  0.927 




State/Local Tax Revenue 
Sales tax revenue 
Capital tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
Federal Tax Revenue 
Personal tax revenue 
Corporate tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
-  12.9 
- 
-  26.4 
13.6 
-  12.8 
4. I 
-7.6 










-  6.5 
-23.6 
11.7 




Notes: All revenue figures in tables are in billions of  1983 dollars; details may not add 
due to rounding. Predicted revenue gain is $28.7 billion. 204  George R.  Zodrow 
Table 6.2~  Equilibrium Effects of Eliminating Deductibility 
N*  =39, 0 Endogenous, Grants Constant 
Variable  +=O:  j=  1  j=2  $=I:  j=l  j=2 
Capital tax rates  0.200  0.138  0.301  0.131 
Sales tax rates  0.125  0.079  0.083  0.081 
Gross wages  0.947  0.963  0.941  0.986 
Capital fractions  0.803  0.197  0.775  0.225 
Net return to capital  0.040  0.040  0.036  0.036 
Tax rate variable  0  1.000  1.000  0.964  0.964 




StateiLocal Tax Revenue 
Sales tax revenue 
Capital tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
Federal Tax Revenue 
Personal tax revenue 
Corporate tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 




-  19.7 
11.5 
-  13.9 









-  1.2 
-  15.3 
-47.3 
28.0 
-  19.3 
12.9 
-  13.0 
-0.1 
Notes: All revenue figures in tables are in billions of  1983 dollars; details may not add 
due to rounding.  Predicted revenue gain  is $28.5 billion. 
Moreover, the losses in sector one wages are roughly offset by increases 
in sector two wages. Thus, the primary effect on federal revenues from 
general  equilibrium changes in  income  is due to changes  in  capital 
income, which falls by $9.9 (6.5, 15.3) billion when N* = 29 (19, 39). 
The general pattern of revenue changes is similar to that previously 
discussed. When hr = 29, the increase in RK1  of $19.1 billion is offset 
roughly 6 percent by a reduction in RK2  of $1.1 billion for a net increase 
of  $18.0 billion, while the reduction in  Rcl of  $34.7 billion is offset 
roughly 5 percent by an increase in RC2  of $1.8 billion for a net reduction 
of $32.9 billion. Thus total state and local revenues fall by $14.9 billion. 
The relatively  small equilibrium reduction  in  marginal tax  rates (to 
0 = 0.942 rather than 0.898) implies an increase in federal personal tax 
revenues, with a corresponding reduction in federal corporate tax rev- 
enues, of $8.5 billion. Results which bound these are obtained for N" 
= 19 and 39. For example, the increase in federal personal tax revenues 
and the corresponding decrease in federal corporate tax revenues are 
$5.5 (12.9) billion for hr = 19 (39). 
Finally, table 6.3 presents the same information (for hr = 29) for 
the case where federal government matching rates are assumed to be 
held constant, but the dollar value of matching grants is reduced in 
response to the reduction in own-revenues raised by  state and local 205  Eliminating State and Local Tax  Deductibility 
Table 6.3  Equilibrium Effects of  Eliminating Deductibility 
N*  =  29, 8  and Grants Endogenous 
Variable  +=O:  j=l  j=2  +=I:  j=l  j=2 
Capital tax rates  0.211  0.157  0.305  0.145 
Sales tax rates  0.132  0.095  0.091  0.098 
Gross wages  0.944  0.958  0.932  0.974 
Capital fractions  0.431  0.569  0.534  0.466 
Net return to capital  0.040  0.040  0.038  0.038 
Tax rate variable  0  1.000  1.000  0.930  0.930 




StateiLocal Tax Revenue 
Sales tax revenue 
Capital tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
Federal Tax Revenue 
Personal tax revenue 
Corporate tax revenue 
Total tax revenue 
-  13.0 
- 
-  34.2 
18.8 
-  15.4 
4.0 
-  10.0 
-  5.9 
11.4  -  1.7 
-  9.6  - 
2.2  -  32.0 
-  1.4  17.4 
0.8  -  14.6 
I .3  5.3 
1.7  -  8.2 
3.1  -  2.9 
Notes: The change in total federal revenue of -  $2.9  billion is equal to the reduction in 
matching grants. All revenue figures in tables are in billions of 1983 dollars; details may 
not add due to rounding. Predicted revenue gain is $28.6  billion. 
governments. Since the reduction in own-revenues is relatively large 
for median voter itemizers who experience a large change in the ef- 
fective price of government services, the reduction in federal revenues 
needed to balance the budget is potentially important. When N*  = 29, 
the percentage of the predicted reduction in marginal tax rates which 
is eliminated is reduced to 32 percent from 43 percent (0 can be reduced 
to 0.930 rather than 0.942). 
6.5  Conclusion 
To  the extent the model analyzed in this paper is suggestive of the 
actual response of  state and local governments to the elimination of 
federal tax deductibility, the results indicate that the increase in federal 
revenue-or the permitted reduction in marginal tax rates-is  likely to 
be less than that predicted by  “static”  revenue-estimating techniques. 
The revenue shortfall predicted ranges from 25-58  percent of the pre- 
dicted static revenue gain from eliminating state and local tax deduct- 
ibility; the results presented by  Lindsey (in this volume) suggest that 
a 38 percent revenue shortfall is the best estimate. These results suggest 
a revenue shortfall larger than the revenue loss of  15-20  percent pre- 206  George R. Zodrow 
dicted by the Treasury in generating its revenue estimates (see Nester, 
1987) and more in line with the magnitudes suggested by Feldstein and 
Metcalf  (1987).  Moreover, the  model  analyzed  here  considers  only 
substitution by  state and local governments into corporate taxes and 
nonresidential property taxes on capital; to the extent substitution would 
occur into revenue sources which are deductible by businessses, such 
as the land portion of nonresidential property taxes, severance taxes, 
business user fees, etc., further federal revenue shortfalls would be 
expected. The results also indicate that changes in federal grants pol- 
icies are a significant factor. If  matching rates stay constant and pro- 
grams are not added or increased, reduced own-expenditures by  state 
and local governments will  reduce federal expenditures,  thus atten- 
uating revenue problems due to changes in the state and local revenue 
mix. However, one could easily argue that eliminating deductibility is 
likely to increase pressures for more “targeted” federal aid programs, 
and  that increases in  such programs will  further exacerbate federal 
revenue shortfalls. 
In any case, it is clear that the results of  the fairly primitive model 
analyzed here should be viewed as suggestive. A variety of extensions 
would enhance the model; these can be divided into three groups. First, 
the  model  could  be  elaborated  in  a number  of  ways.  Housing  and 
property taxes could be treated explicitly, as could other sources of 
state and local revenue; this would require modeling of  the state and 
local choice between the taxes analyzed here and other revenue sources 
such as user charges, selective sales taxes, severance taxes, the land 
portion of nonresidential property taxes, debt, etc. The determination 
of the amount of capital income as well as its allocation could be more 
exact, and a specification of saving behavior could be included so that 
sales taxes paid would not be overstated for savers. The progressive 
nature of state and local income taxes could be modeled explicitly, in 
the same way the progressive  structure of  the federal tax  system is 
modeled above. A method of allowing for the reduction in the number 
of itemizers that would occur as the deduction for state and local taxes 
were eliminated could also be incorporated in the model. 
Second, the assumptions regarding the determination of  state and 
local tax and expenditure policy could be altered. For example, mod- 
eling a situation where the state and local governments act to maximize 
a welfare function which weights the utilities of  various jurisdictional 
coalitions-along  the lines of the “average voter” model-would  seem 
to be a useful extension; in  particular, it would be interesting to con- 
struct an average voter model where information regarding the existing 
mix of state and local taxes would be used to infer the weights in the 
governmental welfare function. Although the current model may have 
characteristics similar to an average voter model where itemizers are 207  Eliminating State and Local Tax Deductibility 
relatively important in the political process in one sector and nonitem- 
izers are relatively  important in the other sector, a formal analysis is 
required before any statements can be made with confidence. 
Finally,  it would  be possible to analyze the model  in  much more 
disaggregated  form, applying the general equilibrium modeling tech- 
niques popularized by Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1985). 
In addition (perhaps) to a larger number of production goods, such a 
treatment would allow a relatively large number of  sectors composed 
of broadly similar states. Such a disaggregation would provide a much 
clearer picture of the effects of eliminating deductibility across specific 
states. This brief discussion suggests that, even if  analysis is limited 
to the basic model structure utilized in this paper, there are quite a few 
directions for future research. 
Notes 
1. It  should be noted that the extent to which Treasury revenue estimates 
are “static”  is frequently overstated; see Nester (1986). 
2. The assumption of a fixed  N* greatly simplifies the analysis.  However, 
note that N* ideally should be endogenous, since the number of  itemizers in 
any jurisdiction  will be affected by the elimination of the deduction for state 
and local taxes. 
3. The value of N’  = 29 differs from Lindsey’s value of 28 only because the 
District of Columbia is  included in my sample. See Lindsey (in this volume) 
for the explanation of how this figure was derived. 
4. See Diewert  (1978) for a discussion  of  the properties of the restricted 
profit function. 
5. Note that the absence of an explicit treatment of housing also implies that 
any effects of eliminating deductibility on the choice between owner-occupied 
and rental housing is ignored. 
6. No attempt is made to account for either (i) any limitation on the extent 
to which sales taxes are  only partially deductible because the tables of estimated 
sales taxes paid provided to taxpayers by the Internal  Revenue Service un- 
derstate actual sales taxes paid, or (ii) the fraction of  sales taxes which are 
actually paid by businesses rather than individuals. 
7. This formulation assumes federal taxes paid are not deductible against 
state and local taxes. 
8. This assumption greatly simplifies the governmental optimization problem 
because the (relatively small) feedback effects of changes in the government’s 
capital tax rate on the capital income of the median voter can be ignored. 
9. The 1982 Statistics of  Income, Individual Income Tux Returns issued by 
the Internal Revenue Service indicate that less than 9 percent of adjusted gross 
income in the $15,000-$20,000  income class is derived from interest, dividends, 
and net capital gains. 
10. This approach assumes for simplicity that matching grants apply to lump- 
sum grant funds; since such funds are held constant throughout the analysis, 
the only effect of the assumption is that the matching rate is estimated con- 208  George R. Zodrow 
servatively. Also, note that no attempt is made to model the “flypaper effect” 
of lump-sum grants; that is, there is no tendency for higher expenditures out 
of lump-sum grants than out of own revenues. 
1 I. Since the value of p changes I  percent or less in all the simulations, this 
seems to be a reasonable assumption. 
12. Note however that the results presented here are not directly analogous 
to those obtained by Lindsey since no attempt is made to weight taxpayers by 
their probability of voting in determining either the division of states into the 
itemizer and nonitemizer sectors or the median voter in each sector. Unfor- 
tunately,  publication  time constraints required  that a full  integration of the 
Lindsey results with those presented in this paper be left to future research. 
13. This corresponds to the allocation of interest, dividends, and net capital 
gains across these two income classes reported in the 1982 Statistics of Income, 
Individual Income Tax Returns issued by the Internal Revenue Service. 
14. For the various simulations reported below, the values of the CES dis- 
tributive share parameters are around 0.95, the values of k,,,,  are around -0.4, 
and the values of KN2 are close to zero or slightly positive. The positive values 
of  KN2 suggest an expectation of  greater than full shifting or, more likely, the 
fact that even jurisdictions where the median voter is a nonitemizer will take 
into account the fact that some residents are itemizers and use a higher t2  and 
lower k2 than implied in the analysis (a lower k2 yields a lower implied value 
of kN2 in the initial equilibrium). Another explanation, suggested by Lindsey 
(in this volume), is that the relatively low income states which constitute sector 
two maintain relatively low capital tax rates in the hope of attracting new firms 
from the relatively high  income states that make up sector one. 
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Comment  Don Fullerton 
For years, the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) and the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT) have had responsibility for estimating revenue and 
other economic effects of alternative tax policies.  Academic econo- 
mists have estimated efficiency and distributional effects of taxes, but 
they tend to regard tax revenue as a relatively uninteresting by-product 
or intermediate step in the maximization of  social welfare. They have 
criticized government  revenue-estimating models as ad hoc, with in- 
stitutional detail rather than theoretical foundation, but they have pro- 
vided few of  their own as alternatives. Despite the interest of economists 
in overall welfare, the recent tax reform experience makes clear that 
important policy decisions are often based primarily on considerations 
of revenue. Thus academic economists are beginning to provide more 
research on the methodology of revenue estimation. 
This paper,  by  George R. Zodrow,  is a welcome addition  to  this 
relatively new line of research. It is also a unique addition. On the one 
hand, the revenue-estimating models of  OTA  and JCT use data with 
considerable disaggregation and computer programs with considerable 
coverage of  tax  law provisions. They  incorporate behavioral adjust- 
ments, but elasticity parameters are prespecified. Analyses are typi- 
cally based on partial equilibrium models. On the other hand, academic 
economists have provided econometric models, using past behavioral 
reactions to infer how agents would respond to proposed tax law changes. 
Don  Fullerton  is an associate professor  of  economics at the  University  of  Virginia 
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They use the latest statistical techniques, but typically the parameters 
are estimated from reduced form equations that are consistent with a 
number  of  alternative theories  or structural  models.  The estimated 
elasticity parameters are essential for producing better revenue esti- 
mates, but often the data are not sufficiently robust to  distinguish among 
these  structural models.  As a consequence, it is  difficult to isolate 
exactly how and why behaviors adjust. These models also are typically 
partial equilibrium models. 
In  contrast,  Professor Zodrow’s  paper  provides  neither elasticity 
estimates nor institutional detail, yet it nicely complements the other 
lines of research. It is a general equilibrium model. It uses exogenous 
behavioral parameters,  specific functional forms for utility and pro- 
duction, and market-clearing equilibrium conditions, and it sorts out 
the net effects of tax changes in the pure world of  the computer sim- 
ulation model. It employs the minimum detail necessary to demonstrate 
exactly how and why various behaviors might adjust in response to tax 
policy. 
The topic in this case is the repeal of deductibility at the federal level 
for state and local taxes paid by  individuals. Despite Congress’s re- 
jection of  the proposals by  the Treasury and the president to repeal 
deductibility of all such taxes, the topic is still alive. Deductibility was 
repealed for selective excise taxes in 1964, for gasoline excise taxes in 
1978, and for general sales taxes in  1986. The recent proposals have 
effectively put the deductibility of all state and local taxes on the table 
for the discussion with respect to future revenue needs. 
The analysis in this paper is complicated by the fact that it deals 
with more than just individual behavioral adjustments that can be based 
on utility maximization. It also deals with the decisions of institutions 
for which there  is  no  such solid theory of behavior. State and local 
governments are induced to switch from sales or personal taxes that 
have lost deductibility to business taxes that are still deductible. The 
model must therefore specify how different state and local governments 
react to voters that are affected in different ways, and how the economy 
reacts to the change in the tax mix. Hence a median voter model with 
two sectors (one controlled by itemizers, the other by  nonitemizers), 
two tax instruments (one on individuals that loses deductibility,  the 
other on businesses), and two factors (capital that is mobile, and labor 
that is immobile). 
The paper does not answer all possible questions, however, and the 
author nicely recognizes its limitations. The paper points out how re- 
sults are sensitive to certain parameter assumptions, how some state 
and local taxes are omitted, and how the current model might be changed 
to incorporate average voter behavior, more disaggregation, changes 
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explicit treatment of housing,  and endogenous decisions to itemize. 
The remaining discussion will simply clarify and expand on potential 
limitations. 
First, in the choice between a median voter model and an average 
voter model, the results  often do not differ very  much. Indeed, for 
many distributions, the mean and the median themselves do not differ 
very much. In this case, however, the models would be very different. 
In this median  voter model, one sector is completely  controlled  by 
itemizers who want their government to switch from personal taxes to 
deductible business taxes, even though capital leaves the jurisdiction. 
The other sector is completely controlled by nonitemizers who are able 
to take advantage of the lower price for capital that enters the juris- 
diction. In an average voter model, however, neither sector would be 
so extreme. Depending on the weights for itemizers and nonitemizers 
in each sector, all state and local governments might shift partially into 
deductible  business taxes, instead of one sector shifting a lot. However, 
capital would  not  be able to avoid the tax by  moving elsewhere, so 
factor prices and other results might be quite different. In fact, if both 
sectors were a mixture of itemizers and nonitemizers, it is not clear 
that there would be any point in having two sectors. 
Second, as in  all  Harberger models  of this type, it  is  difficult  to 
interpret the length of the time period under consideration. Short-run 
aspects are mixed with long-run aspects. In particular, the time frame 
in this model allows all state and local governments to put the issue to 
the voters, to adjust  their tax mix  in response to that vote, to shift 
expenditures, and to  change the size of the local public sector. It allows 
capital to flee from one sector to the other, and it allows labor to move 
within each sector to equalize the wage. However, this amount of time 
is not enough for labor to cross sectors, for technology to change, or 
for capital to grow. The odd result, to somewhat overstate the point, 
is that labor can move from New York to California if  both are con- 
trolled by itemizers, but not from New York to Connecticut if the latter 
is controlled by nonitemizers. 
Third, the model usefully concentrates on one kind of adjustment, 
but it therefore ignores others. In response to repeal of deductibility, 
state and local governments change their tax mix. Also, however, we 
might expect individuals to shift toward purchase of commodities for 
which prices implicitly or explicitly include taxes that are still deduct- 
ible.  Some at the margin  might  be induced  to  rent  homes, so that 
landlords could deduct property taxes, rather than to own homes them- 
selves. Others might change itemization status. It is the combination 
of many such effects that is incorporated in conventional econometric 
estimates, even though the exact source of the net effect is not always 
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Fourth, Professor Zodrow chooses to assume that all capital income 
is received by taxpayers in the top two tax brackets. As a consequence, 
the median voter never receives any capital income. The data generally 
show, however, that the ratio of capital income to labor income is quite 
high in low-income brackets that include many retired individuals. This 
ratio falls in middle-income brackets with predominately wage-earners, 
and it then rises again in high-income brackets. This U-shaped pattern 
could create serious difficulties for a median voter model. In general, 
for such a model, the voters must be ranked  by a single criterion  so 
that the voter with the median value can determine the outcome. Often 
we assume that income is the important criterion. If this reform affects 
relative factor returns, however, then the capital-labor ratio of income 
might  be important. The ranking by  income  is not  the same as the 
ranking by capital-labor ratio. 
Fifth, despite my  earlier  comments that academics have  overem- 
phasized welfare effects while ignoring revenue-estimating techniques, 
this  paper does the reverse. It provides  revenue estimates that are 
based on a solid theoretical foundation of utility-maximizing individuals 
and  profit-maximizing  firms  in  competitive equilibrium.  Given  this 
foundation, it would be relatively straightforward to calculate equiv- 
alent or compensating variations for each group and thus show distri- 
butional and efficiency effects. In particular, the current deductibility 
of personal taxes only in the itemizer sector implies a differential sub- 
sidy to that sector. In the absence of offsetting externalities or other 
distortions, this differential  subsidy would  create a welfare loss. Its 
removal would  increase  efficiency in the sense that the gains to the 
nonitemizing  sector would exceed the losses to the itemizing sector. 
Such calculations  would  not  establish  the absence of  any spillover 
benefit of local public expenditure that could justify a differential sub- 
sidy, but they could quantify the implications of such an assumption. 
This is exactly the type of calculation provided in other general equi- 
librium models of taxation, so the results would be of further interest 
for comparison purposes. 
Finally, this paper shows the degree of error associated with making 
static revenue estimates, but  the definition of “static”  is necessarily 
arbitrary.  In fact, the term has become quite value-laden  since gov- 
ernment revenue estimates have been criticized as static for ignoring 
any number of possible behavioral  adjustments despite the inclusion 
of many important ones. This paper compares results from the general 
equilibrium  model  to results  assuming no behavioral  adjustment. It 
implicitly criticizes an easy target, however, because nobody ever as- 
sumes such fixed behavior. In this case, government revenue estimates 
showed that 15-20  percent of revenue would be offset by certain be- 
havioral adjustments. Other standards might be more useful for com- 214  George R. Zodrow 
parison.  In particular, it is  straightforward  to incorporate behavioral 
adjustments in a partial equilibrium model, so the contribution here is 
the general equilibrium modeling rather than the behavioral adjustments 
per se. It might be interesting then to compare these general equilibrium 
results to analogous partial equilibrium results that assume the same 
type of behavioral adjustment. 
I suspect that a set of good partial equilibrium models would provide 
many of  the same qualitative results that are obtained here. Results 
would still be sensitive to the number of states dominated by itemizers, 
the elasticities of substitution, and the choice of mobility assumptions. 
The value of a general equilibrium model is to calculate plausible changes 
in relative prices. 
These comments represent further discussion  of  the paper rather 
than criticisms of it. The question arises whether relative price results 
of the current model could be incorporated usefully into government 
revenue estimates. In this case, I think not. The relative price effects 
from this model capture a very interesting but very particular effect, 
not the overall impact on relative prices of complicated proposals for 
comprehensive tax reform. Since no general equilibrium model can be 
large enough or robust enough to calculate equilibrium wages and rates 
of  return  after  tax reform, or even to establish  unambiguously  the 
direction of change, government revenue estimates might already in- 
corporate the best available procedures by fixing those relative prices. 